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A Unique Take on NPS: Important Then, 
Critical Today 
Fifteen years ago, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) was 
spared from the Base Realignment and Closure Study for 
good reasons. The school is even more important and 
relevant to naval and national security today. 
 
By Dr. Wayne Porter, Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired) 
February 2021 | Proceedings | Vol. 147/2/1,416 
 
In March 2005, Admiral Michael Mullen, then Commander, U.S. Naval Forces 
Europe and Commander, Allied Joint Force Command summoned me to his 
office. He had learned I had two master’s degrees from the Naval 
Postgraduate School, and he had a special project for me. “I want you to write 
a paper I can give CNO [Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern] Clark to 
help get NPS off the BRAC list.” He was referring to the Congressional Base 
Realignment and Closure study then underway to save money by eliminating 
unnecessary or redundant military installations across the country.  
Then-Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics) Michael W. Wynne’s 4 January 2005 memorandum, “2005 Base 
Closure and Realignment Selection Criteria,” identified the criteria by which to 
measure “Military Value.”  They were: 
 
1. The current and future mission capabilities, and the impact on operational 
readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact 
on joint war fighting, training, and readiness. 
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace. 
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future 
total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to 
support operations and training. 
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications. 
 
Faculty and students from NPS’ Physics Department recover autonomous gliders for 
environmental monitoring. (Naval Postgraduate School) 
 
Other effects of base closure considerations also were cited, among them: the 
extent and timing of potential costs and savings; the economic impact of 
closure on existing communities in the vicinity; the ability of infrastructure of 
both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, 
missions, and personnel; and, the environmental impact. So, cost savings was 
only one consideration in deciding whether to close or realign an installation. 
This is where I focused my eventual “cost–benefit” analysis. As I would later 
write, “In the case of the Naval Postgraduate School, to make a closure 
decision primarily on cost considerations is to miss the very essence of what 
the school represents operationally, academically, and intrinsically to the Navy 
and to the Department of Defense.” 
 
Over the next several days, I did much research online and had many long-
distance exchanges of information, data, and insights with the staff of then-
NPS Provost Dr. Dick Elster in Monterey. As the analysis and narrative began 
to take shape, I briefed Admiral Mullen on the direction I was taking. He made 
a few adjustments and told me to proceed.  
 
Two weeks later, I was again summoned to the admiral’s office in Naples. He 
said, “Congratulations.” Admiral Clark had used the paper to make a 
successful argument for Congress to remove NPS from the BRAC list. The 
arguments CNO Clark used 15 years ago are still valid and worth repeating. 
 
What Remains the Same? 
The 2005 Naval Postgraduate School White Paper was divided into several 
sections. Each one addressed a unique aspect of NPS that contributed to the 
school’s “military value.” The opening section, an overview, was preceded by, 
“The ability of our officer and enlisted leaders to anticipate and manage the 
challenges of tomorrow is only limited by our foresight today.” The assertion 
made here, was that: 
NPS may be one of our best tools to ensure the alignment of advanced 
operational concepts and technologies among the Department of Defense, 
Homeland Security, Inter-agency, and international military partnerships. 
Rather than considering closure of NPS, we should be focusing on how to 
better maximize the return on our investment. These rewards could well 
include our Navy’s preeminence in educating and retaining the most 
technologically advanced war fighters in the world, both officer and enlisted, 
and our military’s assured superiority in Joint and coalition warfare for 
generations to come.  
 
Fifteen years later, having conducted research and taught in both the 
Graduate School of Information and Operation Sciences and the Graduate 
School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, as well as in the Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security, and having served as advisor on many 
theses and Capstone research projects in each, I am convinced more than 
ever this remains true.  
 
The next section of the 2005 White Paper started with “We can’t afford to build 
tomorrow what we have today!” This section focused on the establishment in 
1951 of the Monterey, California, campus and relocation of the Naval 
Postgraduate School. At that time, the campus covered 135 acres along the 
Pacific Coast Highway and was purchased for $660,372 as part of a 627-acre 
buy. By 2005, the NPS holdings included 620.5 acres that originally cost $1.3 
million. This included classrooms, research facilities, laboratories, ballistics 
and radar test facilities, UAV flight ranges, and ocean spaces. The school’s 
proximity to other leading academic and research institutions—including 
Stanford University, UC Berkeley, UC Santa Cruz, the Defense Language 
Institute, and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, as well as to Silicon Valley, the 
world’s center of technological innovation—make its location unique. The 
current value of this real estate alone would be difficult to assess, and its 
intrinsic value in drawing talented faculty and students alike, while showcasing 
the American dream for our international students and partners, is 
incalculable. 
 
“In attempting to compare apples to apples we miss the core differences.”  
 
This bad pun introduced the White Paper’s most lengthy, data-driven, and 
perhaps most effective discussion. An August 2000 Proceedings article, “The 
Naval Postgraduate School: It’s About Value,” provided a comparative 
analysis of costs associated with a degree from NPS to a “similar degree” 
from a comparable, tier one civilian university. I went on to explain that, “… 
‘similar’ though the degrees may be when displayed on a sheepskin, and 
surely just as challenging in their pursuit, a civilian course of study almost 
certainly does not represent the same tailored, defense-centric, militarily 
career-enhancing curriculum provided by NPS.” This was followed by 
addressing a crucial flaw in any such cost comparison that failed to address 
the Educational Skills Requirements (ESRs) dictated by the Secretary of the 
Navy, the Joint Professional Military Education courses that enabled officers 
to satisfy both their master’s degrees and their joint military education 
requirements while at NPS, nor the additional coursework required to ensure 
the student appreciates the military relevance of the academic material and 
can apply that knowledge immediately upon rejoining the operational force. 
 
 
Navy Lieutenant Steve Yang, an undersea warfare student,  
researched the theoretically predictedacoustic radiation force on a body  
that is small compared to the wavelength of the sound. (NPS) 
 
Another “core” difference between NPS and tier one graduate schools was the 
non-trivial issue of admission requirements. Many tier one universities require 
a minimum 3.0 undergraduate GPA, good scores on the Graduate Record 
Exam, and, usually, the accepted area of study for a master’s program must 
be in the student’s same or related field of undergraduate study. The White 
Paper admitted: 
 
“The truth is that many NPS students would not gain entry into Tier One 
schools whose entrance criteria are not meant to consider the attributes of a 
combat warrior with proven leaderships skills, capable of managing complex 
weapons systems (a review by civilian universities of 300 Navy officers 
enrolled at NPS revealed they would admit only 12% directly and 13% with 
additional courses).”   
 
Further, few if any tier one graduate schools would accept students with non-
technical undergraduate degrees into technical master’s programs in the 
numbers the Navy required. I since have heard Admiral Mullen, a 
Distinguished Graduate of NPS in Operations Research, remark on multiple 
occasions that he probably would not have been accepted into another 
graduate program as a lieutenant! As a faculty member I can say with 
certainty that my students are every bit as capable and more. Students don’t 
apply to NPS, they are selected based on their proven operational 
performance and leadership potential.  
 
Before comparing the cost of a master’s degree from NPS with a similar 
degree from a tier one university, it was necessary to explain the differences 
in academic years, total credit hours required in the two systems, and the 
average number of months required to complete a degree. Unlike most tier 
one universities working on a fixed academic calendar with new student 
enrollment limited to the fall only, the Naval Postgraduate School works on a 
quarter system and admits students into its broad array of curricula year-
round. As stated in the 2005 White Paper,  
 
“Bearing operational demands in mind, particularly during this time of war, this 
loss of scheduling flexibility would have a significant impact on the number of 




Field Trip! Lieutenant Kristen Ainsley, U.S. Navy, an undersea warfare oceanography 
student, participated in ICEX 2020. Ainsley’s research explores the acoustic dynamics 
of diffusive convection, often observed in the Arctic Ocean. (NPS) 
 
But it was the “academic op tempo” at NPS, when compared with most civilian 
graduate schools, that drove the most significant differences in cost: 
 
At NPS, the academic school year is based on four, twelve-week quarters 
consisting of 16 classroom hours per week. Although academic calendars 
vary at civilian universities, typically students attend classes 13 hours a week 
for 32 weeks of the year, and may attend a ten week summer term for seven 
hours a week. This amounts to approximately 58% more student-faculty 
contact hours per academic year at NPS than at a typical civilian university.  
 
In other words, an NPS student could complete the 96 credit hours required to 
earn a degree in 18 months versus the 24 to 28 months that would probably 
be needed at a civilian university. That translates into six to ten months of 
additional tuition and a student’s salary to be covered by the government, 
while the servicemember attends classes rather than returning to an 
operational assignment. Even considering the costs associated with an NPS 
student who might need an additional 4.8 months on campus for transition 
and refresher courses, beyond the 18 months to earn the degree, the total 
tuition and salary costs would still be less at NPS. Furthermore, the NPS 
student would have completed JPME requirements for Joint Certification, a 
defense-related thesis, and would have met all educational skills requirements 
in under two years.  
 
But there was another question that needed to be addressed: “How much 
would be saved by moving NPS to an existing military installation in a less 
expensive geographic area?” Keeping the same academic tempo in place, the 
cost of living and possibly operating costs would be lower. But this is where a 
purely fiscal analysis fails to consider the intrinsic value as a critical element in 
any cost benefit analysis.  
 
Operationally and intrinsically, Naval Postgraduate School is a model 
environment for military academic excellence and a showcase of American 
values for international students. It should serve as an incentive for our best 
and brightest officers and enlisted personnel who seek graduate degrees to 
enrich and enhance their military careers and improve their post-career job 
prospects as well (in fact, many of these students should be encouraged to 
pursue defense-related employment upon retirement from the service, thereby 
bringing their extensive military experience and graduate education into 
government or private sector defense-related fields). NPS also imprints a 
strong positive impression of America and our military on international 
students, many of whom will go on to be senior leaders, with considerable 
influence, in their own militaries. Fond memories of NPS and the friends with 
whom they studied there will pay further dividends on our investment through 
stronger collective security partnerships in the future. 
 
Many of these intrinsic benefits are nonetheless tangible. The idyllic setting of 
NPS and its proximity to other prestigious universities and centers of 
innovation attracts research faculty from the finest universities in the nation. 
Would a less attractive and culturally rich environment leave the same 
favorable and lasting impression of America on international students and 
their families? And as for our U.S. students:  
 
“The post graduate experience should be enriching both academically and 
socially. With the capital investment we have made in Monterey, California, 
we can offer the finest quality of life for our students and their families as an 
indication of our commitment to them and to their futures.”  
 
They deserve no less and they repay us with so much more.  
 
NPS student Canadian Army Major Jason Dalziel investigates the quasi-static, dynamic, 
and fragmentation behavior of the M3 reactive material. International students are an 
important part of the NPS educational experience and help build strong connections 
between the United States and its allies and partners. (NPS) 
 
The White Paper summed up a final intrinsic comparison between distributing 
our students among various universities and keeping them at NPS as follows: 
“While a civilian university might come close to equaling some of the intrinsic 
value associated with NPS, the vital operational aspects of the 
curriculum...would be missing. Professors would generally not have the 
extensive defense-related experience common among the NPS faculty, nor 
could they be expected to demonstrate military applications of their subject 
matter. Student/faculty contact hours would be less . . . since civilian 
universities routinely use graduate assistants to teach some graduate level 
courses, and university research would not be 85% defense related as it is at 
NPS. The academic environment, while perhaps representing a refreshing 
change for military students, would tend to take minds away from the 
challenging operational applications of their course of study. In fact, the 
opportunity to work with other service members and with international military 
students would be largely lost. As would the ability to introduce foreign officers 
to a challenging and enriching glimpse of what their military futures could hold. 
The return on investment in sending military students to civilian universities . . 
. would be far less than it is...at NPS.” 
 
The next section of the 2005 White Paper was introduced as follows:  
“If our task was to design a graduate university to prepare America’s young 
military leaders for the dynamic challenges and opportunities of a vastly 
different tomorrow it would be joint and international, have diverse defense 
and inter-agency related curricula, be held to the highest academic standards, 
taught by professors experienced in advanced military research. It would be 
cost effective and offer the highest level quality of service needed to draw and 
keep our best…” 
 
NPS is this and more. The White Paper provided data, details, and examples 
to illustrate the joint, interagency and national security, international, naval, 
and transformational nature of the student body, the vast spectrum of 
curricula, and contributions made by students and faculty research in a time of 
war.  
 
“Naval Postgraduate School is ideally placed to serve as the centerpiece of a 
Navy Education Strategy that takes a total force, lifelong approach to serving 
our Navy family and our nation’s defense needs.” 
NPS was subsequently removed from the BRAC list in 2005.  
The U.S. military involvement in ground wars in South Asia has greatly 
diminished, but the threat to U.S. interests and security from peer competitors 
is on the rise. This was clearly enunciated in the most recent National 
Defense Strategy that also referred to an erosion of our military advantage, 
both of which are being addressed through an increase in defense spending. 
The national debt has gone from $7.3 trillion (61 percent of GDP) in 2005 to 
$26.5 trillion at the end of Q2 2020 (136 percent of GDP). Most recently, a 
global pandemic has had a dramatic strategic impact on economies and 
cultural interactions. We have adjusted to new norms of work and are 
reconsidering the viability of mega cities as well as vulnerabilities in global 
interdependencies. 
 
Key enabling (or disruptive, depending on who controls them) technologies 
continue to emerge, contributing to the increasing complexity of today’s 
strategic environment. These include, but are not limited to:  
• AI and Robotics—The development of both specific and general AI will 
dramatically change warfare (outpacing human cognition and reaction/decision 
time). 
• 5G LTE, IoT—Ubiquitous cyber capabilities will increase anonymity and 
vulnerability. 
• Nano technology, molecular build, additive manufacturing—Will revolutionize 
logistics, energy, battlefield medicine, others. 
• Quantum Encryption, Communication, and Computing—Could ensure reliable 
cyber security and much greater communications and computing power. 
• Energy Sources and Uses—Renewable sources of energy will be integrated with 
traditional power sources and will affect weapons, propulsion, resupply/recharge, 
dwell time. 
Many aspects of warfare today are vastly more advanced than in 2005, 
including:  
• Complex, Adaptive Combat Systems of Systems—Leveraging artificial 
intelligence for anticipatory, emergent, self-organizing, and adaptive behavior to 
changes in the operational environment. This will be necessary for logistics 
networks, counter swarm capabilities, layered defensive systems, manned and 
unmanned weapon and sensor integration. 
• Hypersonic Weapons—The greatest challenge may be in developing a 
C4Iinfrastructure capable of responding without humans in the loop. 
• Interconnected Economic and Military Power—Control of vital resources to 
include minerals, rare earth elements, water, etc; market access, currency 
valuation, sanctions, and trade wars.  
• Ability for Population Centers to be Taken Off the Grid—Entire populations, 
infrastructures, or economic sectors may be held hostage forcing governments to 
capitulate.  
• Increased Hybrid / Cyber Warfare—To generate havoc, mistrust, plausible 
deniability. 
• Weaponization of Space—More nations now have the ability to place satellites in 
orbit for military purposes. 
• Hybrid or Localized Conflict—Battle zones may increasingly feature littorals, 
choke points, disputed islands, and EEZs. Bastion Defenses linked to the control 
of critical resources and SLOC access, including the South China Sea and the 
High North. 
Civilian and uniformed leaders have turned over at all levels many times 
since 2005. This has had an impact on NPS, and under the guidance of 
President Ann Rondeau, the school has demonstrated great flexibility in 
shifting focus to the new strategic environment through innovation, 
increased partnerships with industry and academia, and in helping to 
define the military’s role in great power competition. The school’s revised 
mission statement succinctly asserts:  
The Naval Postgraduate School provides defense-focused graduate 
education, including classified studies and interdisciplinary research, to 
advance the operational effectiveness, technological leadership and 
warfighting advantage of the Naval service. 
 
To accomplish this mission, NPS today provides more than 70 STEM-based 
curricula, and more than150 labs and all-domain test ranges to enable 
experimentation, as well as a secure environment to conduct classified 
research and education. As a new member of the Naval Research and 
Development Enterprise (NR&DE), the school partners with Department of the 
Navy Warfare Centers, Naval Research Laboratory, and the Office of Naval 
Research. Each quarter it pairs students familiar with the most current 
operational experience and ideas with sponsors and faculty supporting ONR’s 
S&T portfolio, conducting more than $100m in sponsored research aligned to 
the curricula and focused on national security. Annually, this results in more 
than 1,000 research theses and Capstone reports published every year, and 
between 15 to 20 patents. And unlike most civilian universities and research 
facilities, there are no Chinese or Russian nationals taught at NPS, all but 
eliminating the export of our work to the nation’s two greatest adversaries. 
 
NPS is fully recognized as a research and education institution with faculty 
and students working on cutting-edge technologies, analyses, and 
wargaming. The NavalX Tech bridge at NPS leverages proximity to Silicon 
Valley and is connected directly to the NR&DE. This covers the spectrum from 
cyber security to artificial intelligence and machine learning to space sciences 
and robotics to systems engineering, operations research, combat logistics, 
national security studies, and the broad spectrum of natural and soft sciences 
as they apply to warfighting and combat effectiveness. NPS has just 
inaugurated the Wayne P. Hughes Naval Warfare Sciences Institute under the 
direction of Professor of Practice Jeff Kline, Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired), to 
coordinate educational and research responses to fleet and other defense 
sponsors. This includes an ongoing warfare innovation continuum focused on 
anticipating warfighting requirements and tactics. 
 
 
As part of his thesis at NPS, Navy Lieutenant Brendan Geoghegan built a next-
generation virtual reality software program in which players or test subjects can 
immerse themselves as a conning officer on the bridge of a Navy ship. (NPS) 
 
The strategic environment, enabling technologies, and the culture of 
education have dramatically changed in the past 15 years. The Naval 
Postgraduate School has not only kept pace but has demonstrated the ability 
to anticipate and adapt to these changes. This continues to be accomplished 
through joint, interagency, international, uniformed, and civilian participation 
on campus and through distance learning, at the master’s and doctoral levels. 
Undeterred by the pandemic, NPS has largely shifted to distance learning and 
remote access using the school’s flexible “.edu” servers and resources. While 
efficient, distance learning cannot replicate the high quality in-resident 
student-learning experience I described, nor can it replace the value of 
learning-by-doing through applied research that every master’s student must 
complete to graduate. 
 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Mike Gilday visited NPS on 17 
December 2020 and declared, “NPS is the Navy’s applied research university. 
There are functions that occur here that [the Navy] can’t get anywhere else in 
the world. The surplus of experience and knowledge partnered with the ability 
to work on classified material on a secure campus makes NPS an invaluable 
asset to the fleet.” 
 
NPS is not a cost to minimize, it is a capability to optimize. The strategic 
environment, enabling technologies, and the culture of education have 
dramatically changed in the past 15 years. NPS has not only kept pace but 
has demonstrated the ability to anticipate and adapt to these changes. This 
continues to be accomplished through joint, interagency, international, 
uniformed, and civilian participation on campus and through distance learning, 
at the master’s and doctoral levels. NPS provides relevant solutions and 
graduates warrior-leaders prepared for the contemporary battlespace. They 
are the "weapon system" we deliver.  
 
Now, more than ever, we must leverage the defense-focused research and 
graduate education uniquely catalyzed at NPS to deliver capabilities for 
warfighting advantage: technologically and intellectually. Important then, 
critical today, NPS is unlike any other graduate institution in the 
country: responsive, interdisciplinary, applied, innovative, 
classified, and secure.  
 
 
Diverse by design: Students in Dr. Porter’s Defense Analysis and Systems Engineering courses 
include officers and enlisted professionals from the U.S. military and allied and partner nations. 
In this class, students from the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Army, and the Hungarian Army and 
Indonesian Navy apply what they learn--including from each other--to warfighting problems. 
(NPS) 
 
 
 
